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COMMENTS ON RECENT DECISIONS
or mortgage by him will not constitute a severance as against a pur-
chaser at a foreclosure sale. The test is whether there is actual sever-
ance." There are many other cases which are opposed to the idea of
constructive severance. In Beckman vs. Sikes, 35 Ka. 120, it was held
that the lien of the mortgagee and the decree of foreclosure attached
to growing crops as well as to the land, and that the purchaser of the
land under the decree was entitled to growing crops as against the
vendee of the mortgagee. In Fruit Company v. Sherman Worrel Fruit
Co., 142 Cal. 643; 76 Pac. 484, the court decided that a chattel mort-
gage cannot operate against a purchaser of a trust deed as a severance
of the growing crop from the land. In Riely v. Carter, 75 Miss. 798;
23 S. W. 435, the court said in their opinion that the lien of the mort-
gagee attached to the growing crop until severed, as well as to the
land. In a leading New York case, it is said that a prior mortgage
takes precedence over a sale of the crop and thus takes precedence over
the vendee's rights by purchase of the crop under execution levied on
the crop, Shephard v. Philbrick, 2 Den. 174. The decision of the Su-
preme Court of Missouri when the Bradley case, supra, comes before
it is a matter of conjecture. Should they decide as the Kansas City
Court of Appeals did in saying that the execution of the chattel mort-
gage alone without any actual severance will not constitute such con-
structive severance as to entitle the holder of the chattel mortgage
to the crop, they would seem to be supported by the weight of
authority, but there is authority to the contrary. M. L. S.
Hardin v. Wolf et al., 148 N. E. 868. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1925.
JOINT TENANCY-DEED OF TRUST-SEVERANCE. A
bill in equity for partition by Mark Hardin against Mary J. Wolff and
others, in which William O'Brien intervened. Mark Hardin owned a
lot improved by a brick building in the city of Chicago. The property
was subject to two liens, one in favor of Mary J. Wolff, and the other
in favor of a third party. Hardin conveyed the property to Mary J.
Wolf, his daughter, who conveyed the property to a law clerk, who
reconveyed the property to Mark Hardin and Mary J. Wolf to take
and hold as joint tenants with a provision that on the death of one the
survivor was to take all the residue of the property. It was the inten-
tion of the parties that the daughter was to take care of the father until
his death, and that as payment she was to become owner of the prop-
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erty at his death. To protect his interest in the property, the father
directed his daughter to execute a note for the full value of her share
in the property secured by a deed of trust on her undivided interest
in the property in favor of O'Brien, the intervener, without considera-
tion. Now Mark Hardin, the father, brought this bill for partition
alleging that the execution of the note secured by the deed of trust
severed the jointure, and that he is entitled to the note and deed of trust
saying that the man O'Brien held the same in trust for him. The
dauaehter, Mary J. Wolf. contends that the note and deed of trust were
executed without consideration, therefore they are null and void, that
the unity is not severed, and that she is still entitled to share the
property. O'Brien filed a bill of interoleader. The master decided
that the execution of the deed of trust severed the iointure. Held,
that ordinarily the execution of a mortea.re by one ioint tenant severs
the iointure but that in this csse the note and deed were aiven without
consideration and void, that the intention of the parties was to create
a joint tenancy, and the joint tenancy was not severed.
At common law the execution of a mortzae by one joint tenant
severed the tenancy, York z. Stone, 1 Salkk. 158, in re Polland's
Estate, 3 DeGex, J., and Sm., 541, Walkinson v. Hudson. 4 L. J. Ch.
0. S. 213, Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons. 1 Binney 175; 2 Amt. Dec.
425. In York v. Stone. supra, the court decided a mortgage severs the
joint tenancy, Chancellor Cowper saying "That a joint tenancy is an
odious thing in equity, . . . that it is to the disadvantage of the
mortgagor that the joint tenancy should continue, because if he happen
to die first all his estate and interest goes from his representatives
to the survivor, unless it be construed a severance." In re Polland's
Estate, supra, it was held that a mortgage by one joint tenant severs
the tenancy. In Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons, supra, Chief Justice
Tilghman of the Pennsylvania court said: "The court are of the opin-
ion that the mortgage severed the tenancy." Statements to the same
effect are to be found in several textbooks. "A mortgage by a joint
tenant of his share to a stranger would be effectual against survivor-
ship, and may amount to a severance of the joint estate," 1 Wash. Real
Prop. (4th Ed), 412. "Joint tenancy is severed by a mortgage, at any
rate for the time being until paid or redeemed," Thompson Real Prop.,
1716. "In jurisdictions in which a mortgage ordinarily operates to
transfer the legal title, a mortgage by a joint tenant, which involves
such a transfer, will no doubt cause a severance of the joint tenancy,"
I Tiffany Real Prop., 191. The clause in Tiffany's statement "ordinarily
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operates to transfer the legal title" is a point to be considered. The
cases referred to above were decided in jurisdictions where the com-
mon law doctrine that a mortgage is a transfer of a legal estate to
the mortgagee was in force. Such is not the case in all jurisdictions
today. In some twenty-six states today a mortgage is regarded as a
mere lien, and no estate passes to the mortgagee, at least not till de-
fault and foreclosure; in seventeen states the common law rule that a
legal estate passes to the mortgagee applies; while in three others,
Missouri, Delaware and Mississippi, a mortgage is regarded as a mere
lien till default when an estate and right of entry vest in the mort-
gagee, Thompson Real Prop. 4367. In Illinois, a legal estate vests in
the mortgagee when the mortgage is executed, 4 Scammon 69, 69 Ill.
632, 124 Ill. 32, 186 Ill. 570. That Illinois rule is probably the under-
lying basis on which the court in Hardin v. Wolf, supra, stated that
the execution of the mortgage severed the tenancy, and an influence
which had bearing on the decision in Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194, 96
N. E. 892, an earlier decision in which the Illinois court decided that
a mortgage severed the jointure. What ruling the courts would make
in states where the mortgage is regarded as a mere lien is somewhat
a matter of conjecture. The modem aversion and statutes against
joint tenancy and its incidents has caused a dearth of litigation on that
question. However, it seems unreasonable to believe that in states
where a mortgage is a mere lien that the execution of a mortgage
could be a severance of the joint tenancy, at least before foreclosure.
M. L. S.
TORTS.
Davoren et al. v. Kansas City, 273 S. W. 401.
NEGLIGENCE- LIABILITY TO INFANTS- ATTRACT-
IVE NUISANCES. In the recent case of Davoren et al. v. Kansas
City, 273 S. W. 401, we have again the question of liability for injury
to an infant who is upon premises because he was attracted by a con-
dition of the premises. The original suit was instituted in the Circuit
Court of Jackson County by Davoren and his wife to recover dam-
ages for alleged negligence in the drowning of their minor son. The
facts as developed at the trial were as follows: Some twenty years
before the fatal drowning occurred, the city constructed a high fill
or dam across a ravine for the purpose of building a street. The city
did not build a culvert or any outlet for the release of surface water
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